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Phonology has been a central concept in the scientific study of
dyslexia over the past decades. Despite its central position,
however, it is a concept with no precise definition or status. The
present article investigates the notion of ‘phonology’ in the tradition
of cognitive psychology. An attempt is made to characterize the
basic assumptions of the phonological approach to dyslexia and to
evaluate these assumptions on the basis of commonly accepted
standards of empirical science. First, the core assumptions of
phonological awareness are outlined and discussed. Second, the
position of Paula Tallal is presented and discussed in order to shed
light on an attempt to stretch the cognitive-psychological notion of
‘phonology’ towards auditory and perceptual aspects. Both the core
assumptions and Tallal’s position are rejected as unfortunate, albeit
for different reasons. Third, the outcome of this discussion is a
search for what is referred to as a ‘vulnerable theory’ within this
field. The present article claims that phonological descriptions must
be based on observable linguistic behaviour, so that hypotheses can
be falsified by data. Consequently, definitions of ‘dyslexia’ must be
based on symptoms; causal aspects should not be included. In fact,
we claim that causal aspects, such as ‘phonological deficit’, both
exclude other causal hypotheses and lead to circular reasoning. If
we are to use terms such as ‘phonology’ and ‘phoneme’ in dyslexia
research, we must have more precise operationalizations of them.
Keywords: phonology; connectionism; phonological deficit; circularity; definition; phono-
logical awareness
INTRODUCTION
U
ntil about the end of the 1960s, a common view of dyslexia was that it
arose as a consequence of sensory or perceptual anomalies in the visual
system. In the early 1970s, the focus moved to cognitive and linguistic
factors}in particular, phonological factors. At about the same time, we also saw
a rekindling of interest in biological factors, which had been a central concern at
the very start of research on dyslexia (Miles & Miles, 1990). In recent years, Paula
Tallal has brought the focus back to sensory and perceptual factors, but this time
in the auditive system. Her work thus represents a break with tradition}but not
a complete break, because she claims that phonological factors are still relevant
(cf. Brady, Scarborough, & Shankweiler, 1996).
The present article consists of three major parts. First, we look into the
phonological-deficit hypothesis in order to present and discuss the characteristics
of the construction of phonology in this tradition. The second part examines the
work of Paula Tallal, which constitutes a contemporary alternative to the
predominant phonological-deficit hypothesis. In this second part, we wish to
present and discuss the findings made, the theories used to explain the data and
the various claims made by Tallal and her co-workers. The motivation for doing
so is the search for conceptual clarity, because we claim that the notion of
‘phonology’ is highly unclear both in the original hypothesis and in Tallal’s
version of it. The third part investigates the notion of ‘phonology’ beyond
cognitivism. In this part, we do not give prominence to any one direction of
phonology}several can in fact be considered useful. Instead, we focus on the
basic prerequisites for such approaches to be empirically sound.
THE PHONOLOGICAL-DEFICIT HYPOTHESIS
The notion of ‘dyslexia’ has been defined in different ways over the past decades.
However, notions like ‘phonology’, ‘awareness’ and ‘phoneme’ have been central
in the dominating approaches to dyslexia. In short, it can be summarized that
‘phonology’ denotes the sound system, ‘phoneme’ denotes the basic unit in this
system and ‘awareness’ is the means by which the individual can gain access to
the sound system.
It should not be too controversial to claim that most dyslexia research in the past
30 years has built on a particular strand of linguistic theory. The linguists John C.
Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson describe how, in the 1960s, linguistics and
psychology contributed to the rise of cognitive sciences ‘which favoured a strong
emphasis on the commonality of human cognition and its basis on human genetic
endowment’ (1996, p. 3). In cognitive sciences, the dominant linguistic strand has
been generative grammar, a theory which gives priority to underlying linguistic
structures through a distinction between competence (innate language faculty) and
performance (speech). According to this distinction, competence carries the
universal commonalities while performance is the more or less random realization
of these structures in the particular language and situation (Chomsky, 1975). This
distinction is also at the core of what is called autonomous linguistics:
Just as autonomous linguistics distinguishes between a speaker’s purely linguistic
knowledge, determined by the language faculty, and his non-linguistic knowledge,
derived from pragmatic competence and the conceptual system, so autonomous
phonology splits off the act of speech as an articulatory, acoustic, and perceptual event
from the abstract linguistic system which is claimed to underlie the physical data.
(Taylor, 1991, p. 28)
The belief in the existence of an underlying system along these lines is firm in
dyslexia research: ‘We earlier defined phonological coding as the ability to use
speech codes to represent information in the form of words and parts of words.’
(Vellutino, Fletcher, Snowling, & Scanlon, 2004). However, as we are not alone in
thinking, this approach is unfortunate if the focus is to be kept on empirical
science:
Faith is a beautiful thing, which a non-believer can only regard with awe. At the time
of writing, that seems to be how matters stand. There are many who share Chomsky’s
faith, and for them ‘The research program of modern linguistics’ (Chomsky 1988: Ch. 2)
must without arrogance be his program. Others cannot bring themselves to accept that
it has empirical content. ‘C’est magnifique, mais peut-eˆtre ce n’est pas la linguistique.’
But all they can do is watch and wait. (Matthews, 1993, p. 252)
First, autonomous linguistics presupposes the existence of structures which are
too abstract to be falsified by data}in other words, structures which cannot be
treated as hypotheses (see discussion below). Second, the focus on underlying
structures creates a huge amount of metaperspectives with a highly uncertain
status. As an example, the linguistic descriptions of semantics, phonology,
morphology and syntax are awarded the status of ‘processes’ in cognitive flow-
charts (cf. Vellutino et al., 2004, p. 4) without consideration of their function in
linguistics. The fallacy of equating linguistic descriptions with mental processes
was committed early on in Chomsky’s authorship; to some extent already
between Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects (1965). We consider this position
to represent naı¨ve realism.
Our conception of linguistic behavior is biased by a tendency to treat processes,
activities and conditions on them in terms of object-like, static, autonomous and
permanent structures, i.e., as if they shared such properties with written characters,
words, texts, pictures and images. Though my discussion will be confined to linguistics,
I am well aware that the same type of bias can be found in many other sciences.
(Linell, 1982, p. 1)
As part of the turn towards linguistics and phonology in dyslexia research,
scholars subscribing to the phonological-deficit hypothesis have adopted and
reinforced central assumptions of orthodox generative grammar (see Table 1).
This involves assuming the position of autonomous linguistics. However, this
approach is problematic from an empirical point of view. Because of the
distinction made between a stable and innate system (competence) and a
variable, random use of this system (performance), every observable phenom-
enon is subordinated the abstract system by phonological rules. As a
consequence, such rules obstruct the endeavour to meet high standards of
empirical science. This is because priority is given to an abstract system with an
axiomatic base, and the phonological rules formulate how the abstract system can
account for variation in speech. In other words: it is hypothesized that there is a
deficit in the phonological system, but it is difficult to see how this hypothesis
can be falsified. In this sense, a specific conception of phonology becomes
an a priori entity which is left beyond discussion. This is remarkable considering
the development of phonological theory in linguistic circles over the same
period of time}a period characterized by major discoveries and advances
(Horne, 2000).
The notions of ‘phonology’ and ‘awareness’
It can be argued that the turn towards phonology in dyslexia research was
influenced by assumptions from the linguistic tradition in the joint venture of
linguistics and cognitive psychology in the 1960s. In retrospect, it is evident that
the turn towards ‘phonology’ was not accompanied by a thorough reflection of
the adopted assumptions. There was simply no group of critical researchers
focusing on the linguistic assumptions. Alvin Liberman is for many scholars an
early linguistic alibi for reading and dyslexia research, however, his view of the
relation between spoken and written language (Liberman et al., 1989) reflects
little more than traditional and questionable assumptions in the tradition of
linguistics (Linell, 1982; Wengelin, 2002, Uppstad, 2005).
The lack of reflection on the notion of ‘phonology’ may turn out to have dire
consequences, not least with regard to the extensive theory-building that has
Table 1. Overview of basic assumptions and common inferences underpinning the theory
of ‘phonological awareness’
Phonology is linguistic, written language is not
Inferences
The lexicon can be accessed only by speech
Phonological structure is directly relevant to written language, but not vice versa
Phonology is natural, written language is an artifact
Inferences
Speech is a matter of ontogenesis, written language is simply an artifact
Speech is part of the human being, written language is external
Phonology means segmental, linear structure
Inferences
Prosody is peripheral, not part of phonological structure
Sound units are linearly ordered, discrete or not
Segmental structure is universal
Phonology is platonic
Inferences
Phonology is abstract, distant from the phonetic, acoustic pronunciation
Phonology must be accessed when learning to read
Phonology can be accessed only by awareness of phonological units
Phonology is highly representational
Inferences
There is a specific mental level where a phonological structure with psychological reality
and communicative relevance can be identified and described
The representation is distant, and qualitatively different, from speech
been undertaken on the basis of the phonological-deficit hypothesis. What is
more, there is a general vagueness in the research field concerning what
‘phonology’ means. Even the famous linguist Roman Jakobson refused to use the
term ‘phonology’ back in the late 1970s, because of the conceptual mess
(Jakobson, Taylor, & Waugh, 2002). And yet the confusion referred to by Jakobson
is minor compared with the vagueness of the notion of ‘phonology’ identifiable
over the past decades in the field of reading research. The Jakobsonian objection
addresses the rejection by generative grammar of the structural view of
distinctiveness, and therefore it amounts to precise criticism of a competing
theory. In reading research, the maintenance of the notion is inconsistent,
denoting partly letter sounds, the sound system, sounds in general, a language
module in the brain, as well as mental units of sound. The outcome of this
inconsistency is that the notion of ‘phonology’ has been fully encompassed by the
notion of phonological awareness. This claim can be made on the basis of the
following assumptions:
(1) Phonological structure is what is accessible by awareness: Because phonology
is abstract, it is different and distant from the acoustic signal and the
acoustic shape of speech. Phonological structure can therefore be accessed
only by awareness of units. According to this assumption, speech must
be phonetic in general but the units which one can be aware of (phonemes)
are phonological.
(2) The distinction between the notions of ‘phonological’ and ‘phonetic’ is not
operationalized: The problem is that ‘phonological awareness’ is an extremely
vague concept and is therefore of little use in the maintenance of the
phonetics–phonology distinction.
(3) Awareness is a necessary and sufficient condition for category membership: This
means that there are no categories other than those we can be aware of.
The phonological-deficit hypothesis focuses on awareness of segments, and
uses this awareness to represent phonological skills. There is no tradition in
the research field of dyslexia for extensive, phonological analysis of words
and utterances. Phonological rules are relevant only to a certain extent,
and they are used mainly to describe aspects of awareness. According to
this assumption, awareness is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the evaluation of phonological skills. A second problem related to this
assumption is the belief that awareness can be measured independently from
other skills.
The arguments concerning ‘phonological’ and ‘phonetic’ may seem like hair-
splitting to some scholars. In our view, however, they are of great importance,
mainly because the basic assumptions about phonology inherent in the
phonological-deficit hypothesis require that a distinction be made between the
two terms. This is because the basic theory underpinning the phonological-deficit
hypothesis is based on autonomous linguistics, and the hypothesis presupposes
two distinct levels of explanation: a phonological one and a phonetic one
(speech). In the research tradition focusing on ‘phonological awareness’, it is
hardly ever shown how to move between these two levels of description by
phonological rules which are teleological and normative. What is more, few can
perform such analyses in any consistent way, and even fewer have seen any
reason to do so. This is alarming, because the use of phonological rules is the only
way to show the connection between the two levels in autonomous linguistics. To
put it short: autonomous linguistics in general can be questioned from an
empirical perspective, but autonomous phonology without phonological rules is
nothing less than a disaster. However, in some of the directions taken by
generative phonology in the last decade, there is also a blurring of the distinction
as to what is ‘phonological’ and ‘phonetic’, respectively (Kager, 1999), but here
the blurring is intentional and founded on basic assumptions about acquisition.
In the phonological-deficit hypothesis, though, the blurring is accidental and
projects a flaw in the conceptual system.
If we take a look at Vellutino’s work from 1979, we find that his intentions are
ambitious:
The primary purpose is to examine the theoretical foundations of these conceptualiza-
tions, closely scrutinizing their logical consistency, their empirical validity, their overall
productivity. A special effort is made to discuss the methodology and conclusions
drawn from the studies reviewed, as well as to analyze their conceptual bases.
(Vellutino, 1979, p. 3)
Considering the fact that this book introduces the ‘linguistic turn’ in dyslexia
research, it is highly remarkable that none of the intentions quoted above aims at
the core concepts of the new paradigm}the notions of ‘linguistic’ and
‘phonology’. That is why we will make an effort in this part of the article to
outline how the notions of ‘phonology’ and ‘linguistic’ are established in the
writings of some central proponents of the phonological-deficit hypothesis. The
purpose of doing so is primarily to include the notion of ‘phonology’ in the
hypothetical construct of the phonological-deficit hypothesis.
The foundation of the phonological-deficit hypothesis
The notion of ‘phonology’ in dyslexia research is linked to a specific conception
of ‘linguistic’. Since the phonological-deficit hypothesis is an explanation of how
the acquisition of written language is hampered by a deficit in the ability for
spoken language, the notion of ‘linguistic’ is restricted to spoken language.
Written language is only ‘linguistic’ in the sense that it is dependent on spoken
language skills. (Liberman et al., 1989; Vellutino, 1979; Vellutino et al., 2004).
Throughout Vellutino’s book on dyslexia (1979), the notion of ‘linguistic’ is
reserved for speech. Explicitly, the same position is held in the 2004 article of
Vellutino et al.:
Visual coding processes, broadly defined, refer to sensory and higher-level visualiza-
tion processes that facilitate storage of representations defining the visual attributes of
environmental stimuli, including the graphic symbols used to represent written words.
Linguistic coding processes refer to processes that facilitate language acquisition
and the use of language for coding, storing and retrieving information. (Vellutino et al.,
2004, p. 4)
The distinction between ‘visual’ and ‘linguistic’ may well be because the
linguistic turn was an antithesis to earlier hypotheses implying visual deficits.
As a consequence, the notion of ‘linguistic’ denotes speech, and written language
is simply considered as a representation of speech. Paradoxically, in this way
written language}being parasitic}can be ‘phonological’, but not ‘linguistic’ by
the fact that ‘phonology’ seems to denote a structure of spoken language relevant
to written language while ‘linguistic’ denotes language ability in spoken
language: ‘Written words are encoded (symbolized) representations of spoken
words, and spoken words are encoded representations of environmental
experiences and entities.’ (Vellutino et al., 2004, p. 3).
In our view, it is clear that the core assumptions of orthodox generative
phonology (Chomsky & Halle, 1968) are adopted by proponents of the
phonological-deficit hypothesis, (Churchland, 1986; Gardner, 1985) and that
these assumptions are maintained in an unfortunate way (see Table 1). In his
article (O¨hman, 1979) in a Festschrift dedicated to the engineer and phonetician
Gunnar Fant, the phonetician Sven O¨hman takes Fant’s contributions to
linguistics as his starting-point in discussing mainly how speech technology
enables the researcher to advance beyond subjective introspection. According to
O¨hman’s view, the study of speech has historically been restricted by the lack of
technology for studying the acoustic signal. Therefore, the traditional analysis of
speech ‘was derived from a subjective, introspective analysis of what one does in
producing the sounds of an utterance’ (p. xvii). According to him, it is therefore
necessary to confront what we ‘know’ (from subjective introspection) about
speech with what the study of the acoustic signal may tell us:
The point is rather that there is a stage in the theoretical analysis of the linguistic
structure of the acoustic speech signal, beyond which unaided auditory perception is
incapable of taking us. And it is beyond this stage that we need to reach in order to be
able to assess the soundness of some of our most deeply seated theoretical principles.
(O¨hman, 1979, p. xviii)
Moreover, such a study is necessary in order to reflect on where the conception
of sound structure comes from. Among what O¨hman calls ‘our most deeply
seated theoretical principles’ he highlights three traditional conceptions of sound
structure to be challenged by modern speech technology:
(1) The discreteness principle says that an utterance of spoken language is always
made up of linguistically-indivisible building blocks drawn from a fixed and
finite inventory of types of such blocks [>the compositional view of
language].
(2) The linearity principle dictates that these building blocks be always arranged
in a linear series along the time axis.
(3) The principle of articulatory posturality claims that the building blocks of an
utterance are best understood as certain postures of the organs of speech.
(O¨hman, 1979, p. xviii, italics mine)
The major discoveries made in phonology over the past three decades have
led to the above principles all being rejected as unfortunate (cf. Horne, 2000).
The advances made in the field of prosody has shown that sound structure
can be better described as acoustic features on different tiers that are associated
with a segmental tier in a dynamic way (rejection of principle 1 above). The
same discoveries in prosody has shown that the arrangement of features is
more nuanced than the above mentioned principle 2, and modern phonology
is therefore often referred to as non-linear phonology. The same discoveries
highlight the importance of the characteristics of the dynamic acoustic signal,
while aspects of articulation are not focused in phonological description
(principle 3).
This focus on prosodic research is partly due to the fact that developments in speech
technology have made it possible to examine the acoustic parameters associated with
prosodic phenomena (in particular fundamental frequency and duration) to an extent
which has not been possible in other domains of speech research. It is also due to the
fact that significant theoretical advances in linguistics and phonetics have been made
during this time which have made it possible to obtain a better understanding of how
prosodic parameters function in expressing different kinds of meaning in the languages
of the world. (Horne, 2000, p. 1)
Notwithstanding this, the scientific study of dyslexia has maintained the
principles referred to by O¨hman in a quite dogmatic way. This situation means
that the theoretical principles underpinning the phonological-deficit hypothesis
seem highly questionable. In order to make empirical progress, the proponents of
phonological awareness must with precision elaborate what is denoted by the
concepts of both ‘phonology’ and ‘linguistic’.
Implications for application
From the theoretical principles mentioned in the previous paragraph as
underpinning the phonological-deficit hypothesis, some features of appli-
cation can be outlined. Every generalization of this kind will be controversial,
because the theorists involved certainly do add important reservations
and nuances. Nevertheless, the generalization presented below is probably
representative of the ‘period of normal science’ for this paradigm (Kuhn,
1970).
The main problem in dyslexia research is that the phonological theory has not
been maintained in a way enabling the basic assumptions to be continuously
exposed to falsification. A second set of problems, which can be derived from the
first, originate from an unreflected conceptual system. In the situation obtaining,
the label ‘phonology’ may be applied to anything related to sound in connection
with speech and writing; whether a given sound is phonetic or phonological may
be left to the author’s ability and desire to remain consistent throughout a paper,
and the outcome of this is that the notion of ‘phoneme’ is the closest one gets to
make explicit what is meant by ‘phonology’.
Problem: the main argument in phonological awareness can be described as
circular
The main argument for the theory of phonological awareness is the high
correlation between awareness of sound segments and reading performance
(Vellutino et al., 2004). This finding has been replicated so often that it is
considered to reflect a causal relationship. However, two conditions have to be
met for this to be the case, namely: (1) that the structure of speech is strictly
segmental (from an ontological perspective); and (2) that writing is parasitic on
speech, i.e. that written language is considered as simply a representation of
spoken language. The latter condition rests on the idea that ‘Written words are
encoded (symbolized) representations of spoken words’ (Vellutino et al., 2004,
p. 3). Both conditions can be considered to be assumed in the so-called
alphabetical principle. In fact, (1) has been strongly questioned in phonological
theory (Horne, 2000) and (2)}the relation of spoken and written language}has
never been treated as a true hypothesis. In every other respect, the relationship
between awareness and reading performance has strong implications not of
causality but of circularity: it would seem to amount to saying ‘those who
succeeded, succeeded’ and ‘those who did not succeed, did not succeed’. In other
words, there is shown to be a high correlation between the level of the same
property in the same individual at two points in time, regardless of whether the
studies involved are experimental or interventional. What tends to happen is that
‘phonological tests’ are conducted on pre-school children. Later on, when the
same children have entered school, they are given reading tasks which focus
primarily on the ‘phonological part’ of reading. No wonder that the correlation is
high! For the purpose of illustration, a corresponding situation could be
imagined if we, say, assessed IQ in pre-school children and then compared the
results obtained with results obtained from the same children after they had
entered school. The obvious origin of the circularity is the segmental analysis of
speech, which fits in with the segmental structure of writing. With regard to the
first point above, relating to the segmental structure of speech, modern
phonology has shown how phonological structure does not favour the segmental
tier (Horne, 2000). With regard to the second point, relating to writing as parasitic
on speech, we should treat the relationship between spoken and written
language as a hypothesis in order to search for true empirical findings.
Surprisingly, the possibility of circularity is hardly ever discussed inside the
paradigm, even if there are strong potentials in such a direction. Goswami and
Bryant’s (1990) questioning of the phonemic focus is a relativization of the
phonemic structure, but this insight is simply added to and rendered harmless in
the paradigm’s phonological theory. Ehri’s (1997) position of written language as
linguistic also strongly challenges the main argument of the current theory.
Nevertheless, it is enclosed in the theory as an alternative to Liberman’s view,
and no mention is made of its potential for falsification of the mainstream theory.
One may ask how such patience with findings contradicting a theory can be
possible in an empirical science. A plausible answer is that this ‘patience’ is due
to overly vague definitions. Let us take an example from geometry: If we want to
generalize the concept of a circle, we have to set some features of some circles
aside. If we investigate circles of different diameters, we will discover that,
independently of the length of the diameter, the circumference will be 3.14 times
longer. The more general term ‘circle’ does not have a fixed circumference or
diameter, and we therefore disregard these features. This notion of ‘circle’ is
therefore more abstract than the notion of ‘a circle whose circumference is 10 cm’.
However, if we generalize further from the notion of ‘circle’ to the notion of
‘figure’, we obtain a term which is less useful in science. This is because, in the
notion of ‘figure’, we set aside so many features that defining the notion becomes
difficult. As a consequence, the notion of ‘figure’ lacks precision compared with
‘circle’, and will also be less fruitful as a scientific notion. Analogously,
autonomous linguistics gives priority to an abstract construction which is not
directly accessible by empirical data, resulting in a situation where the abstract
construction is confused with the features observed.
If we take a look at the state of the art in dyslexia research, we find that
Vellutino et al. (2004) highlight the causal relationship between phonological
awareness and the ability to read and write. Their notion of causality is, however,
constrained by what we have claimed to be poor definitions of basic terms. If the
notion of ‘phonology’ lacks precision, then the argument for causality is flawed.
This is to say that, viewed from a different theoretical position, the main
argument used in theories of phonological awareness can be described as
circular. It is therefore, in light of the philosophy of science, high time to shout
‘the Emperor has no clothes!’. While such a shout does not amount to a
conclusion, it does at least provide a new perspective which may underline the
hypothetical character of every paradigm’s phonological theory. Another related
problem is the lack of distance to their own theoretical foundation which can be
identified in, for example, Vellutino et al. (2004). The notion of ‘logic’ in the
following quotation in fact refers only to the borders of their own theory:
‘Etiological theories, which implicate deficits in such abilities as causally related
to reading difficulties, can be ruled out on logical grounds alone and they have
not fared well in empirical research.’ (Vellutino et al., 2004). And if we go on to
compare the lack of precision of the concepts of ‘phonology’ and ‘linguistic’ with
Vellutino et al.’s objection to the dual-route model, we see a clear mismatch of
ideal and practice: ‘Although such findings are suggestive, the double deficit
hypothesis can be challenged on theoretical, interpretive, and methodological
grounds. As regards its theoretical underpinnings, we suggest that the ‘precise
timing mechanism’ that presumably underlies the formation of orthographic
codes lacks the type of specification that would lend it psychological reality and
allow it to be evaluated experimentally as a valid hypothetical construct.’
(Vellutino et al., 2004, p. 14).
A spectre is haunting reading research, and especially the field of
dyslexia}the spectre of the phoneme. Interestingly, most theorists reject this
spectral notion in some ways. With reference to experimental research, Vellutino
claims that the phoneme is not the unit used in speech processing (Vellutino,
1979). A.M. Liberman first claimed the phoneme as the unit in speech. Later on,
he has repented and admitted that there is no discrete, observable phoneme;
instead, it can be found deep in the phonetic module in the shape of phonetic
gestures (Liberman, 1997). Goswami and Bryant reject the phoneme as the only
structure one can be aware of. Nevertheless, the phoneme is still there. And the
problem is that, in the maintenance of the theory of the phoneme, no alternatives
to the basic theory have been thoroughly discussed; instead, they are
dogmatically rejected (see for example Liberman’s rejection of Tallal and
Lindblom (Liberman, 1999)). As a consequence, we have a situation where the
phoneme is both rejected and accepted, which naturally only enhances the
confusions. The inductive character of theory-building is especially clearly seen
in the writings of Alvin and Isabel Liberman, (Liberman, 1997, 1999; Liberman
et al., 1989), where dogmatic arguments are deployed against features of
theoretical positions which are not at all compatible with the authors’ own
position. While this kind of controversy is of course not unusual in science, the
proportion of arguments belonging to the dogmatic category is alarming. These
arguments are clearly not sufficient to prove A.M. Liberman’s claim about the
relationship between spoken and written language. In our view, dogmatic
positions should be avoided in order to maintain high standards of empirical
science. This can be done by studying behaviour in written and spoken language,
without a priori assumptions of causal relationships.
THE AUDITIVE-DEFICIT HYPOTHESIS
The position of Tallal and her co-workers is interesting because it partly
represents a break with the tradition presented above, and because it places the
focus on perception as a source of deficit. (Even though Tallal’s work was
pointing in this new direction already in the 1970s, it is only in recent years that
more considerable attention has been paid to it.) In this respect, the work of Tallal
stands as an alternative to the mainstream phonological focus. Tallal et al. (1996)
claim that her earlier work on ‘language-learning-impaired (LLI) children’ has
shown that: ‘[R]ather than deriving from a primarily linguistic or cognitive
impairment, the phonological and language difficulties of LLI children may
result from a more basic deficit in processing rapidly changing sensory inputs.’
(p. 81). One of the reasons why this research has received a great deal of attention
in recent years is that CD-ROM programs have been developed which are said to
be very effective in treating language difficulties in general and dyslexia in
particular: ‘In the present study we have demonstrated that training children
with speech stimuli in which the brief, rapidly changing components have been
temporally prolonged and emphasized, coupled with adaptive training exercises
designed to sharpen temporal processing abilities [. . .] results in a dramatic
improvement in receptive speech and language in LLI children.’ (Tallal et al.,
1996, p. 83).
In this part of the article, we wish to present and discuss the findings and
theories which have been used to explain the data and the various claims made
by Tallal and her co-workers. This will be done as an alternative to mainstream
thinking, but also to proceed towards conceptual clarity, which we claim cannot
be obtained unless one goes beyond the positions evaluated in the present article.
The notion of ‘dyslexia’ in the auditive-deficit hypothesis.
Miller and Tallal (1996) have not studied dyslexics per se, but rather the broader
group of what they term ‘language-learning-impaired (LLI) children’. This group
is rather unclearly delimited, as can be seen from this partial definition: ‘We use
the term Specific Language Impairments to refer to a type of communication
disorder similar to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders}
Fourth Edition (DSM-IV, 1994).’ (note on p. 9). Even though Miller & Tallal (1996,
p. 9) remind us that ‘phonology is one of five basic components of oral language
(phonology, semantics, morphology, syntax, pragmatics)’, it would seem to be the
case that they consider phonology to be the most important factor of language. In
particular, it seems as if they are claiming that explaining phonological problems
is much the same thing as explaining most cases of LLI: ‘Taken together, these
experimental findings led us to hypothesize that the deficits underlying the
phonetic reception limitations of a LLI child might arise in early life as a
consequence of abnormal perceptual learning that then contributes to abnormal
language learning.’ (Merzenich et al., 1996, p. 77). Dyslexics, then, seem to be a
major subgroup of LLI children. The imprecise delimitation of the dyslexia group
makes it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding samples based on more
specific definitions of ‘dyslexia’ (cf. Tnnessen, 1995, 1997; cf. also Bishop &
Snowling, 2004).
Symptoms
During the last two or three decades, Tallal and her co-workers have claimed that
the phonological deficit found in dyslexics and dysphasics can be explained as a
result of auditive anomalies (Tallal & Piercy, 1973, 1974; Tallal et al., 1996). For
example, Tallal (1984) claims that the phonological deficit is a symptom of an
underlying deficit in auditory temporal processing. Tallal, Miller, and Fitch (1993)
present three interlocking claims: (1) rapid auditory temporal processing is a
decisive factor in speech perception; (2) the specialization of the left hemisphere
for speech perception (and phonology) found in the vast majority of right-
handed people has to do with this hemisphere’s specialized ability to perform
rapid auditory temporal processing; and (3) the phonological deficit typically
found in, among others, dyslexics is due to a deficit in rapid auditory temporal
processing.
Moreover, they make the further claim that ‘LLI children commonly cannot
identify fast elements embedded in ongoing speech that have durations in the
range of a few tens of milliseconds, a critical time frame over which many
phonetic contrasts are signalled [. . .] For example, LLI children have particular
difficulty in discriminating between many speech syllables, such as [ba] and [da],
which are characterized by very rapid frequency changes (formant transitions)
that occur during the initial few tens of milliseconds.’ (Tallal et al., 1996, p. 81).
These children’s problems in identifying phonetic details and nuances in
speech are said to have many negative consequences: ‘[T]his basic temporal
processing deficit may disrupt the normal sharpening of neurally represented
phonetic prototypes for the native language in LLI children, resulting in a
cascade of negative effects on subsequent receptive and expressive language
development}and ultimately resulting in a failure to generate the robust
phonetic code that is so essential to learning to read.’ (Tallal et al., 1996, p. 82).
This means, first of all, that we should be finding that dyslexics exhibit a
reduced ability to understand speech. There are indeed some findings that would
seem to indicate that this is the case, in particular with regard to the youngest
dyslexics. On the other hand, it is often claimed that a characteristic trait of
dyslexics is the discrepancy between their fairly normal ability to understand
speech and their defective understanding of written material (Aaron, 1989;
Stanovich & Siegel, 1994; Lyon, 1994).
Another consequence of Tallal’s theory would seem to be that dyslexics should
exhibit many errors in articulation, and that they should be using words such as
‘hat’ and ‘cat’ incorrectly or inconsistently, because they cannot correctly identify
and discriminate between the initial phonemes /h/ and /k/. Now, we do find
symptoms like these in some dyslexics, but rarely to any great degree
(Scarborough, 1990).
Tallal et al. (1996) are of the opinion that the ‘temporal-processing deficit’
hinders ‘the normal sharpening of neurally represented phonetic prototypes’,
thereby leading to a ‘failure to generate the robust phonetic code’. As far as we
can see, this should primarily be causing problems in the young pupil’s grasp of
the grapheme–phoneme correspondences. If some of the phonemes found in the
pupil’s long-term memory are not correct, this will lead to problems in learning
to read and write all words containing these phonemes. The child should then
have equally great problems with these phonemes in frequently occurring words
and in non-words; what should be decisive is whether or not a word contains the
poorly learned phoneme. This, however, seems to contradict findings which
show that most dyslexics have most difficulty reading unfamiliar words, pseudo-
words and, especially, non-words (cf. Rack, Snowling, & Olson, 1992).
What exactly do Tallal and her co-workers mean when they state that the LLI
child’s phonetic codes are unclear and unstable? Cognitive psychology holds that
the phonemes are stored as mental representations. It is not immediately
apparent how a mental representation can be unclear or unstable. Anything
represented in long-term memory has to be something definite. (Of course it can
always be wrong, but wrong representations are neither unclear nor unsta-
ble}they are merely wrong.)
Does this mean that we are unable to account for ‘unclear’ or ‘unstable’
representations within the framework of cognitive psychology? We think not.
The best way of doing so, we think, is to be clear about the difference between an
ability and the exercising of that ability. In other words, we may conceive of the
representations in long-term memory as being constant, while the performance
based on those representations is variable. The vagaries of the particular situation
may well impact negatively on a person’s performance, but it is difficult to see
how a permanent deficit in the temporal and/or auditive systems could
sometimes have an impact and sometimes not.
When Tallal describes the psychological mechanisms underlying dyslexia, she
often expresses herself, in our view, unclearly and incompletely. Nonetheless, our
impression is that her thinking is fairly solidly planted in cognitivism’s
mentalistic or symbolic paradigm. Her ‘unclear’ or ‘unstable’ mental representa-
tions in long-term memory would actually be easier to account for within the
conceptual framework of, for example, connectionism. Connectionism is based
on the idea that the activation in a unit and the weights between units are
continuous rather than binary (0 or l). This allows connectionism to explain all
degrees of unclarity and instability (cf. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). In our view
cognitive approaches are still predominant in dyslexia research. We consider
connectionism to be a combination of behaviouristic and cognitive approaches
(Tnnessen, 1999b). In our view Snowling and Hulme are interesting exceptions
(e.g Hulme, Quinlan, Bolt, and Snowling, 1995; Snowling and Hulme, 1999).
However, we do not consider that they have used all the potentialities in
connectionism.
This having been said, we can return to the question of why unclear or
unstable representations should arise as a consequence of a child not hearing
certain sounds. The sounds that the child does hear, or perceive, are clear and
stable; so why should the sounds that he or she does not hear or perceive
suddenly be unclear or unstable?
Regardless of whether we work in a cognitive or a connectionist framework, it
is difficult to see how small details and nuances in perception can have such a
decisive impact on language learning as Tallal is claiming. Both cognitivism and
connectionism, and other schools as well, stress the role of context in both
perception and learning. It is a generally accepted fact that we usually try to fit
information together into coherent wholes. Here is an example. Let us say that
someone has difficulty in discriminating between the phonemes /h/ and /k/
when they appear in isolation. That person would most likely have no trouble
keeping things straight when presented with the sentences: ‘Take off your hat’
and ‘Let out the cat’. Now, would Tallal claim that our subject in both cases
actually ‘heard’ the word ‘cat’}or the word ‘hat’? Or does our subject hear only
/æ t/? When we take into consideration the great amount of redundancy found
in language, it certainly seems quite probable that the /k/–/h/ distinction
problem would resolve itself over time. After all, a person initially handicapped
by not being able to perceive this distinction would be corrected many times in
his or her early years and thus make the necessary adjustments to perception in
light of the context.
Perhaps the most important objections to Tallal’s auditive work have come
from Isabelle and Alvin Liberman and those working in their tradition.
(Shankweiler & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967; Mattingly & Liberman, 1990; Mody,
Studdert-Kennedy & Brady, 1997). The question they have raised may be
formulated like this: By placing so much emphasis on auditive details and fine
discrimination, has Tallal misrepresented the nature of language? Studdert-
Kennedy & Mody (1995) comment thus: ‘First, a CV formant transition is not a
‘series of rapidly changing acoustic events,’ but an integral spectral sweep
reflecting the continuously changing resonances of the vocal tract, as a speaker
moves from a point of closure into the following vowel. Second, as many
experiments have shown (e.g. Mann & Liberman, 1983; Mattingly, Liberman,
Syrdal, & Halwes, 1971), a brief formant transition removed from the speech
signal is heard as a rapid, integral glissando, or ‘chirp,’ of which the parts or
‘spectral changes’ cannot be perceptually individuated.’ (p. 511).
Mann and Liberman (1983) make this claim: ‘Given transitions that change in
relatively small physical steps, from one appropriate for /d/ to one appropriate
for /g/, the percept changes, not in correspondingly small steps, but suddenly
(Mattingly et al., 1971; Studdert-Kennedy & Shankweiler, 1970). This nearly
categorical shift marks a sharp boundary between the phones [d] and [g]; it is
commonly reflected and measured as a relative increase in discriminability of the
stimuli at the category boundary.’ (p. 212). In our view, we have enough evidence
to claim that language is categorical in some sense of the word. But we must take
care not to conceive of the boundaries between the phonemes as clear-cut and
absolute. We cannot define phonemes by a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. Instead, the similarities among the sounds categorized as a certain
phoneme are rather like the similarities one finds among members of a family.
Rosch (1973) measured the reaction time that it took subjects to classify various
instances under concepts. The finding made was that the degree of typicality
predicted the speed at which an instance would be classified. Thus a robin, which
rated as a highly typical bird, was quickly classified as a bird, while a goose,
which was not thought to be a very typical bird, was classified more slowly.
Magnetic attraction is another image used in phonetics to explain how sounds are
categorized into phonemes: the farther away something is from the centre of the
magnetic field, the weaker is the influence of the magnet (see e.g. Kuhl, 1991). For
a discussion of the status of the concept of ‘phoneme’, see Uppstad & Tnnessen
(2005).
Explanations
Miller and Tallal (1996) make this claim: ‘[W]e believe that we have identified an
underlying neurological impairment that disrupts temporal processing rates in
the brains of language learning impaired individuals’ (p. 8). Taken together with
the suggestion that the problems dyslexics have can be traced back to anomalies
in the magnocellular system (Livingstone, Rosen, Drislane & Galaburda, 1991;
Galaburda, Menard, & Rosen, 1994; Miller, & Tallal, 1996; Fitch, Tallal, Brown,
Galaburda, & Rosen, 1994), we discern the following implicit chain of causes in
Tallal’s and her colleagues’ reasoning: (1) Neurological impairment leading to (2)
anomalies in temporal processing leading to (3) auditive anomalies leading to (4)
phonological anomalies leading to (5) language and cognitive problems. As we
see their work, only the first link in this chain, the neurological impairment, is
purely biological. All of the subsequent links belong to the domain of psychology.
Even though Tallal and her colleagues often give the impression that the causal
chain starts off with biological factors, we nonetheless see some statements that
point in the opposite direction. For example, Merzenich et al. (1996) write: ‘These
studies also strongly indicate to us that there may be no fundamental defect in
the learning machinery in most of these children.’ (p. 80).
If Tallal and her colleagues are claiming that dyslexics’ root problem is a
learning problem, then it is difficult to see which type of theory of language
learning they are basing their assumption on. Theories of language learning
would seem to fall into various types. According to Aslin and Pisoni (1980), there
are four types of theories about the child’s perceptual development: (1) The
universal theory claims that children are born with the ability to identify and
discriminate all sounds in all languages. In the course of the child’s first years of
life, this ‘universal’ ability shrinks, as the phonemes not regularly encountered by
the child are not reinforced. Thus an inborn wealth of nuances and distinctions is
gradually reduced. (2) The attunement theory posits a development which goes in
the other direction: here, the child starts out with only a few rough categories,
which over time become finer and finer as a result of stimulation. (3) The
perceptual-learning theory assumes that we are not born with any categories at all;
everything has to be learned. And finally, (4) the maturational theory says that the
ability to phonologically identify and discriminate between phonemes unfolds
according to a genetically determined time-table, irrespective of early experience.
Tallal’s thinking seems to be most in accordance with theory types (2) and (3).
Auditive and temporal factors in dyslexia
Auditive factors
A.M. Liberman and his followers focus on what they see as Tallal’s disregard for
the categorical nature of language. To the extent that one explains phonology on
the basis of non-categorized sound waves, one explains something linguistic on
the basis of something non-linguistic. This may be considered a form of
reductionism (see, e.g. Garfinkel, 1991; Tooley, 1993).
We see a close analogy in the phenomenon of colour. If we try to define colours
on the basis of light-wave length, we run into the same problem. While there is
indeed a perfect correlation between wavelength and colour, what we have is not
a causal relationship. Rather, the relationship between wavelength and perceived
colour is better described by an image of a mountain top. The mountain has two
or more sides with different appearances. Neither side is the ‘cause’ of the
other(s), even though they are of course closely related.
If the theory of Tallal and her co-workers seems reductive, their practice seems
to be the opposite. The training program devised by Tallal and her colleagues
makes one wonder whether they are trying to create something linguistic with
the help of something non-linguistic. Is this possible? Well, first we have to
remember that sound waves are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
perceiving phonemes. In this sense, we see that auditive factors are relevant to
phonology. On purely theoretical grounds, we cannot rule out the possibility that
auditive training can help phonological development. Whether or not this is
actually the case is a question that will have to be decided empirically. And it is
also an empirical question to try to determine how detailed the auditive
information given to the child should be.
THE NOTION OF ‘PHONOLOGY’ BEYOND COGNITIVISM}THE
NEED FOR A VULNERABLE THEORY
The problem with A.M. Liberman’s ‘right’ theory is its platonic character, where
every important phonological feature is beyond falsification. This way of
thinking is very much like Chomsky’s (see Table 1). What is more, awareness
is used for capturing the units of phonology, without any critical discussion of
how awareness can be defined and operationalized.
In research on dyslexia, we should pick the theory which has the best
descriptive and explanatory potential, and which is the most vulnerable, i.e.
which is easiest to falsify. ‘Vulnerability’ is chosen as a criterion here because it
refers not only to the binary logical property of ‘falsifiability’}i.e. whether a
hypothesis can or cannot be falsified. Rather, this notion focuses on the ease with
which a hypothesis can be falsified, and it is therefore a practical criterion as
regards the search for scientific truth. Our notion of ‘vulnerability’ as a practical
criterion is in line with Karl Popper’s philosophy of science (Popper, 1965;
Popper & Eccles, 1977). Indeed, Tallal’s theory is highly vulnerable, and therefore
it can be thoroughly discussed and perhaps falsified. In this respect, Tallal’s
theory is more valuable than e.g. Liberman’s position.
In mainstream dyslexia research, phonological representations play a central
role (Uppstad, 2006a; Uppstad & Tnnessen, 2005). We claim that a strong focus
on representations constitutes a major obstacle to a revitalized conception of the
notion of ‘phonology’ beyond phonological awareness. This is because the idea of
representations presupposes introspection, which cannot be falsified. If we
consider the enterprise of science to be about description, explanation and
understanding, the notion of ‘phonology’ must also be located with reference to
these different purposes. Representations serve the purpose of description and
understanding. In linguistics, one rarely leaves the domain of description, and
this purpose is also predominant in the linguistic theory that constitutes the
foundation of cognitive sciences. This fact represents a problem when causal
hypotheses such as the phonological-deficit hypothesis are presented: it is not
possible to state any falsifiable hypotheses concerning causality. Scientific
disciplines searching for explanations have to be highly sensitive to the quality
of their conceptual apparatus. If we want to explain, we need a conception of
how descriptions and explanations relate. In our view, the purpose of explanation
places specific demands on how we elaborate and maintain descriptions. As we
see it, the most fruitful position is to consider descriptions as hypotheses
(Tnnessen, 1997). The overall problem with scientific disciplines focusing on
description is that they produce static perspectives. This is the case with both
traditional linguistics and cognitive psychology. In our view, the connectionist
position seems to represent the best potential for escaping from cognitive science
and its representational, descriptive focus (cf. Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991).
Phonology is primarily descriptive, but in reading research it is}without further
reasoning}widely applied as explanation. Nicolson (2002) points to this problem
for proponents of the phonological-deficit hypothesis. The same problem
is associated with the status of the concept of ‘phoneme’ (Uppstad & Tnnessen,
2005).
A vulnerable theory also requires precise definitions of core concepts. A more
precise statement is easier to falsify than a vaguer one. In this sense, the notion of
‘phonological awareness’ faces an uncertain future. So far we have focused on the
notion of ‘phonology’, but the other part of the phrase, ‘awareness’, probably
needs as much rethinking as the first. Important questions in this context are:
(1) Are the important aspects of sound seized through awareness? and (2) Is
awareness isolated from other skills? In our view, the lack of adequate answers to
such questions highlights the vague conceptual apparatus found in the theory of
phonological awareness. Concerning the first question, Goswami & Bryant (1990)
present interesting positions which relativize the phonemic focus. Still, this is a
potential that cannot be fully exploited in the framework of phonological
awareness and cognitivism. Concerning the second question, Tnnessen (1999a)
claims that awareness cannot be separated from automaticity. This position
involves a relativization of awareness, in suggesting that awareness and
automaticity can be studied adequately only within the notion of skill.
A direct consequence of the outlined (vulnerable) theory is the adequacy of
studying linguistic behaviour in written language. By studying reading and
writing behaviour without a priori assumptions about the relationship between
spoken and written language, we focus on the activity where the problems of
dyslexics become the most visible (see Uppstad, 2006b for a suggestion of how
this can be done). This means approaching dyslexia through a study of
symptoms e.g. in accordance with psychiatric diagnosing system DSM
(Tnnessen, 1997). When searching for the causes of dyslexia in spoken
language, we should provide definitions without causal factors which should
be treated as hypotheses in daring falsification designs.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have focused on the dominant conception of ‘phonology’ in
cognitive psychology. We have claimed that the theory of phonological awareness
has a definition of ‘phonology’ which is not suitable to empirical research, owing
to its vagueness and empirical status. Further, we have investigated the attempt
by Tallal and her co-workers to stretch the notion of ‘phonology’ towards
perceptual and auditory aspects. We have claimed that this approach lacks a
useful level of generalization of language structure, and that the criteria of
empirical science have not been met. Definitions of ‘dyslexia’ should be based on
symptoms and should not include causes such as ‘a phonological deficit’
(Tnnessen, 1997), because then we delimit the search for causes and risk circular
reasoning. E.g. if we include ‘phonological deficit’ in the definition of ‘dyslexia’
and sample dyslexics on the basis of this definition, then it is not surprising that
we fin a high frequency of phonological deficits among dyslexics. To the extent
that notions such as ‘phoneme’ and ‘phonology’ are included in hypotheses, their
status must be clarified and they must be operationalized according to commonly
accepted standards of empirical science.
In Karl Popper’s concept of ‘falsification’, we find the illustration of the
black swan falsifying the statement ‘all swans are white’. Still, the enterprise of
falsification is not as simple as it may seem, because one must verify that the
black swan truly is black and that it truly is a swan. In other words, we need to
investigate whether deaf people’s reading ability correspond to the exceptions
that Popper illustrates with the black swans. Faced with this population within
the literate community, phonology according to any precise, scientific definition
cannot be seen as either necessary or sufficient for the ability to read. Proponents
of the phonological-deficit hypothesis have chosen either to ignore this fact or to
use non-empirical theory to explain it away. For the proponents of the
phonological-deficit hypothesis, some central challenges must be met: (1) Can
the hypothesis be formulated in such a way that it can be falsified? and 2) Which
empirical findings could falsify the hypothesis?
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